Towards an analytical framework of regional integration in Western Balkans by Sklias, Pantelis & Tsampra, Maria
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Towards an analytical framework of
regional integration in Western Balkans
Pantelis Sklias and Maria Tsampra
University of Peloponnese, Greece, University of Western Greece
15 January 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/36504/
MPRA Paper No. 36504, posted 8 February 2012 03:55 UTC
Towards an analytical framework of regional integration in  
Western Balkans  
 
 
Pantelis Sklias 
University of Peloponnese, Greece 
E-mail: psklias@hotmail.com 
 
Maria Tsampra 
University of Western Greece 
E-mail: mtsampra@uwg.gr 
 
ABSTRACT 
The paper focuses on the regional integration of Western Balkans and its prospects. 
We enrich mainstream political economic approaches by a framework assessing 
regional integration with the use of political, cultural, institutional and economic 
variables: coincidence in political interests and national barriers; common perceptions, 
values, principles and culture; restructuring and maturity of institutions; production 
complementarities, trade flows and financial transactions; technology and 
infrastructures. Evaluating these variables in the Western Balkans, we conclude that 
integration can proceed through a top-down enforced process by the EU or the 
International Community rather, than through individual efforts of the region’s nation-
states.     
KEYWORDS 
Regional Integration, Western Balkans, Political Economy Evaluation Variables 
 
1. Introduction 
In the last 20 years, the Western Balkans went through significant socio-political and 
economic changes at the regional as well as the national level. Along with the 
emergence of newborn states and democracies, market economy structures have also 
been established and functioning. In other words, a new world has been formed in the 
region, consisting of eastern nation-states with western oriented patters of 
development. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the area has enormously increased, as 
a consequence of the region’s path towards economic integration with the rest of 
Europe. Greece has been a pioneer in this field; while Romania and Bulgaria joined the 
European Union in 2007. All these developments meet many of the prerequisites and 
criteria set by neoclassical economic theories for a successful path towards regional 
cooperation and growth. 
However, we argue in this paper that despite the undertaken crucial steps, intra-
regional integration and development is still under question. Regional integration is 
considered as the institutional unification of independent national economies to bigger 
economic entities and efficient markets, in a way that enhances the effective use of 
regional resources (Grupe and Kušić, 2005). This objective is not yet accomplished in 
the Western Balkans, as inter-state cooperation has still a very limited scope and the 
prevalent conditions in the region are not so promising. The political prerequisites 
have not yet been met, while the achieved economic results are now under threat due 
to the latest financial crisis and the limited capacity of Greece to play a key role in a 
positive direction. We suggest that a more powerful political will is now necessary, 
which seems to be out of the hands of the region’s political leaders. 
We shall prove that although economic growth and FDIs have considerably 
contributed to the well being of the regional population in the new born states, political 
development has nevertheless not followed the same path. This has resulted to a series 
of inadequacies and gaps concerning the model of democracy in the region. Even in 
economic terms, wealth is unequally distributed – excluding large portions of the 
population and especially, ethnic and religious minorities. Regional economic projects 
have neither been visualized nor accomplished. As already mentioned, the role of 
Greece as a net FDI contributor and promoter of regional cooperation has been 
severely affected by the recent crisis, both in economic and political terms.  
In this context, we will assess the theoretical considerations concerning the 
prerequisites for regional integration. We will evaluate the level of accomplishment of 
a series of variables, which we suggest that capture the political economy dimension of 
regional economic integration. These variables constitute an analytical framework 
which we apply to the case of the Western Balkans economies in order to justify why 
undertaken integration efforts in the region are limited, and the prospects non-
pragmatic. Finally, we suggest that a top-down policy implementation approach from 
the EU or other International organisation can be more efficient than the state-nations’ 
individual efforts.  
 
2. Theoretical Considerations - Determinants of Regional Integration patterns 
Regional integration and cooperation has been addressed by a considerable number of 
both scholars and policymakers. Nevertheless, the extensive variety of approaches and 
perspectives which have been attributed to regional integration has not led to clear 
definitions and practices. Undoubtedly, evidence links openness – i.e. low trade 
barriers, transparent operation through the price mechanism - and economic growth. 
Thus, developing countries have sought to apply these principles either through 
autonomous unilateral liberalization, or more commonly through participation in 
regional trading agreements. Indeed, nearly every country in the world is a member of 
one or more regional integration arrangements (RIAs), and nearly 60% of world trade 
occurs within such blocs. However, although most preferential trading arrangements 
are regional in the geographical sense, this does not apply for most of their economic 
results (Schiff and Winters, 1998).   
In a global context of proliferating RIAs, the question of the economic and 
political consequences of regional integration is in the core of the discussion 
(Schneider, 2010). But the depth of this debate has been restrained by the absence of 
clear analytical models and empirical evidence on many of the factors under 
discussion. Namely, it has not been formally tested and substantiated whether 
regionalism stimulates investment, whether it confers credibility on reform programs, 
or whether it leads automatically to multilateral liberalization. Moreover, economists 
have not paid much attention to the noneconomic objectives that usually underlie 
RIAs. Understanding the potential linkages between favoritism in trade and 
noneconomic political and social objectives is crucial for a successful pattern of 
regional integration (Schiff and Winters, 1998). 
We therefore attempt to address these issues which define the political 
economy and dynamics of regionalism and development. A significant aspect of the 
discussion concerns the distinction between the “positive” and the “negative” aspects 
of integration (Tinbergen, 1954, p.122). Namely, initiatives such as the abolishment of 
certain barriers including discriminatory treatment and functioning of reductionist 
institutions and policy measures are among those which form the so-called “negative” 
integration. On the other hand, policy adaptation and establishment of new institutions 
and policies with compulsory authority are among those which form the so-called 
“positive” integration. Experience has demonstrated that “negative” integration is 
easier to achieve since “positive” integration and the measures encompassed affect 
national sovereignty and the transfer of traditional state power to hyper-state 
institutions and bodies.  
Balassa (1973, p.1) considers economic integration both as a process and as a 
state of the art. Although the process entails a dynamic element within it, the notion of 
the state of the art is a rather static meaning of a given situation. Eventually, it still 
remains unclear to what extent a given process or situation may lead to a certain level 
of integration at local, regional, or global level. It is important to justify what is the 
exact type and magnitude of a process required to reach a certain level of integration.   
Others (Molle, 1991, p. 5) make a clear cut interconnection among economic 
integration and the gradual abolition of national economic boundaries. In this 
framework, a certain period of time is required in order for the system to absorb the 
consequences of such a gradual abolition of economic borders. This period can be 
anything between five to ten years. Experience has shown that such a transitory period 
has not been necessary in cases such as the one of the EFTA countries, which had to 
satisfy the requirements of the acquis communautaire without such a period. The 
abolition of economic boundaries is also a prerequisite for Pelkmans (1984, p.3).  
Pinder (1969, p. 143-145) considers the union to be the combination of 
different parts into a totality. Integration is a process towards the union. Economic 
integration entails the abolishment of discriminations among the economic subjects of 
the member states as well as the establishment of common policies. Along this line, 
Baldwin and Wyplosz (2006) propose six criteria for a country’s capability to 
participate in a monetary union. These criteria can be based either on economic factors 
like labour mobility, production diversification, and openness; or on political elements 
like the fiscal transfers, homogeneous preferences and the solidarity criterion. 
According to them the European countries do not satisfy either the labor mobility or 
the fiscal transfer criterion, they partly satisfy the homogeneity of preferences criterion 
and it is very unclear whether there exist a common sense of solidarity. Instead, the 
European countries satisfy the trade openness and the production diversification 
criteria. 
Venables (2003) supports that “the outcomes of regional economic integration 
depend on the comparative advantage of members, relative to each other and relative 
to the rest of the world. Countries with a comparative advantage between that of their 
partners and the rest of the world do better than countries with an ‘extreme’ 
comparative advantage. Consequently, integration between low income countries tends 
to lead to divergence of member country incomes, while agreements between high 
income countries cause convergence. Results suggest that developing countries are 
likely to be better served by ‘north-south’ than by ‘south-south’ agreements”. 
However, there is research evidence of per-capita income convergence in 
‘south-south’ integration. The results of Carmignani’s research (2007), covering a total 
of more than 100 countries, show that convergence of per capita income is not 
necessarily a privilege of ‘north-north’ integration. Needless to point that the 
integration process of the less developed economies of Eastern and Southern Europe in 
the EU - as a typical example of ‘north-south’ integration - has not resulted to 
convergence of per capita income. In other words, ‘south-south’ integration does not 
necessarily imply widening intra-regional disparities; indeed, ‘south-south’ integration 
can provide dynamic welfare by enhancing efficiency through mutual learning, by 
enabling economies of scale and scope, by increasing FDI attractiveness and securing 
better bargaining positions.  
Summarizing the above, we can safely assume that the basis of regional 
integration is Regional Integration Agreements (RIAs): the establishment of 
preferential trade relations among countries of a geographic region; and also, the 
removal of restrictions on factor flows between members and consensus on rules and 
regulations governing economic activity are elements of such agreements. In this way, 
at the same time that RIAs serve to remove policy-oriented market distortions in order 
to free trade and factor mobility between members, they introduce new distortions in 
the form of trade restrictions between members and third countries (Balasubramanyam 
et al, 2002). Economic integration may lead to increased geographical concentration of 
industrial production, via self-reinforcing agglomeration processes. (Forslid & 
Ottaviano 2003). 
According to Andriamananjara (1999): “The remaining outsiders would 
probably form their own bloc, which would lead members of the original bloc to 
increase its size in anticipation of the creation of the second bloc. The threat of 
regionalism by outsiders would foster larger regional integration arrangements… Even 
if blocs form and merge simultaneously, yielding progressively larger symmetrical 
blocs, they would fail to converge in a single bloc unless the external tariff was low 
enough. In other words, global free trade could be achieved through bloc expansion if 
trading blocs lowered their external tariffs when abolishing their internal tariffs”. 
A critical issue is that RIAs have differentiated impact on industrial location, 
specialization and consequently, growth inequality in member countries. In more 
recent approaches articulating regional economies with international trade, analysis has 
shifted from nation-states to sub-national localities (Boschma and Iammarino, 2009). It 
is suggested that the historical path of places strongly defines development and 
integration processes, as pre-existing ‘locational’ patterns form strong external 
economies, or capacities. Such different industrialization histories are the case in 
Europe, where trade has developed under protectionism, language barriers and state 
support (Storper et al 2002). 
In mainstream economics, scholars have attributed merely economic 
characteristics to integration processes, with emphasis on the abolition of 
discriminatory measures among participants and on the establishment of joint 
economic policies and institutions. Nevertheless, we argue that such an approach is 
rather restrictive and does not adequately justify the phenomenon, as it does not 
address all of its aspects. Namely, it does not take into account the level of political 
development of the participant states, which is required for the accomplishment of the 
complex task of economic integration. Our main argument is that the elimination of 
mere economic barriers cannot adequately guarantee for the effective mobility of 
goods, services and production resources. Simplifying approaches ignore important 
non-economic obstacles, such as language and culture, principles and perceptions, etc. 
This applies to the institutions and the level of political development of the nations 
concerned.  
 
3. The framework of analysis: the political economy of regional integration 
A richer approach, in order to examine all aspects and evaluate the prospects of 
regional integration endeavor, is necessary to address socio-political and cultural 
aspects of the process. Such dimensions are generally omitted by neoclassical 
economic thinking and this fact leads to obscure epistemological views, misleading 
observations and fragmented illustrations of reality. Political development analysts and 
scholars have clearly put forward both quantitative and qualitative dimensions of 
economic development (Koutsoukis, 1999, p. 84). Qualitative aspects encompass 
“change” and “modernization”, while quantitative aspects entail “growth” and 
“numerical measures”. Political development is regarded as the transition from a given 
situation to a better, broader, and more comprehensive one. This process refers to the 
political system, i.e. the government, institutions and legislative processes, which all 
conclude to a better functioning of the production and distribution of political goods.  
The impact of political preferences on trade preferential arrangements has been 
also addressed in the related literature (Krishna, 1998). Preferential trading 
arrangements are analyzed from the viewpoint of the “new political economy” that 
views trade policy as being determined by lobbying of concentrated interest groups. 
Along this theoretical line of the political economy of trade policy, Grossman and 
Helpman (1994) model lobbying as “the influence on governments in power regardless 
of their political hue”. The application of their theory to RIAS suggests that free trade 
areas are likely to arise either if they provide consumer benefits that allow 
governments to ignore the lobbies, or if they tend toward increased protection 
(Grossman and Helpman, 1995). Empirical evidence leads to two conclusions: first, 
that trade-diverting preferential arrangement are more likely to be supported 
politically; and second, that such preferential arrangements could critically change 
domestic incentives - so multilateral liberalization that is initially politically feasible 
could become infeasible by a preferential arrangement. Unquestionably RIAs are far 
more than just economic policies, and analysts argue that they are an important tool of 
diplomacy.  
Empirical analyses for the impact of political factors and economic diplomacy 
on trade have mainly acknowledged ‘north-south’ and ‘south-south’ trade 
arrangements (Yakop and van Bergeijk, 2011). Political factors have been measured in 
relation to the infrastructure of embassies and consulates (Rose, 2007), changes in such 
infrastructure (Afman and Maurel, 2010) and official state visits supported by this 
infrastructure (Nitsch, 2007). Good and stable political relations built on mutual trust, 
reduce the risk of trade distortions and disruptions (van Bergeijk, 2010; van Marrewijk 
and van Bergeijk, 1993). Economic diplomacy contributes to the promotion of 
international trade by providing information and advice about trade opportunities and 
by acting as host to trade missions; in this way, risk and costs of exporting and 
investing are reduced (Saner and Yu, 2003).   
According to Afman and Maurel (2010), the opening of an embassy in an 
emerging market in Eastern Europe is equivalent to an ad valorem tariff reduction of 
2%–12%. In their paper, Yakop and van Bergeijk (2011) discuss the economic 
rationale for embassies and consulates as means to provide market access and reduce 
market failures. Nonetheless, the effects of economic diplomacy vary between 
different country groups according to their income levels. Positive effects of economic 
diplomacy relate only to trade flows that originate or end in developing countries 
where value is added (Yakop and van Bergeijk, 2011). This particularly applies to 
‘south–south’ trade, and to a lesser extent to ‘north-south’ trade. 
The question rising is how political objectives affect the existence, shape, and 
evolution of RIAs. As Schiff and Winters (1998) put it, trade among neighboring 
countries provides security directly, e.g. by raising the level of interaction and trust 
among the people of participating countries, by increasing the stake of each country in 
the welfare of its neighbor, or by increasing the security of access to the neighbor's 
strategic resources. Under these assumptions, an RIA maximizes welfare by providing 
an optimal way to internalize the positive externalities. To justify an RIA in political 
terms requires evidence showing that trade preferences contribute to valuable political 
rapprochement, which would not have happened if the RIA had not been formed. 
Identifying the motivation for an RIA does not alter its economic and political effects, 
but it does allow a rational discussion of the policy options (Schiff and Winters, 1998). 
The main issue is still, whether regionalism encourages multilateral liberalization.  
Dascher and Haupt (2008) argue that: “At borders where rich and poor 
countries meet, services prices differ hugely. In principle, price differentials could be 
exploited to mutual benefit, offering improved job opportunities to the poor as well as 
better shopping opportunities to the rich. However, cross-border shopping is often 
limited by the substantial transaction costs of crossing the border. Moreover, local 
governments frequently fail to cut these transaction costs even where they have the 
opportunity to do so.  
The impact of culture on processes, practices and dynamics has also been 
etxrapolated by scholars .  Koutsoukis et. al. (2011) have demonstrated that:  
“Culture is one of the factors to be considered for the transformation of the social 
capital to economic development achievements. Culture and economy create a circuit 
of two-way inflows and outflows. On one side, the economy supplies culture (the 
political-social architecture, the institutional environment, the legal civilisation, the 
behaviours related to values) with inflows, such as investment capital, capital 
equipment, technology and specialised workforces. On the other side, culture, through 
the institutionalised system of redistribution of public revenues for social provisions 
and programmes (state budget) and the effective operation of the rule of law state, 
transforms the above inflows of resources to social capital. Furthermore, by means of 
increasing the social dividend it boosts the process of independent development, thus 
leading to the utilisation of all social forces and modernising the productive 
framework through the inflow of scientific and properly trained human resources. The 
institutional architecture and the axiological origins of the society affect the policies 
followed, since they relate culture to development in a harmonious manner”.  
 
Hazakis (2011, p.180) further enriches the research on competitiveness by 
encompassing a series of qualitative factors in his analyses. More precisely, he states 
that:  
“… the notion of competitiveness is as much about qualitative factors (i.e., networks, 
interactions of institutions), as it is about quantifiable attributes (i.e., patenting rates 
or export market shares). Consequently, more attention should be given to the issue of 
the link between structures, agents and norms, to understand not only competitiveness 
outcomes, but also factors that determine the content of competitiveness. To put it 
simply, competitiveness depends both on intra-organisational resources and on extra-
organisational assets. One needs to understand the dynamic interplay of these factors 
in a particular institutional setting, to explain the failure or success of firms”.  
On this ground, we argue that the political economy of regional integration can 
only be comprehended as part of a holistic approach capturing the different levels of 
political and economic development. In such an approach, a series of indicators can be 
considered, namely: 
Economic indicators including: 
 GDP growth  
 Trade in goods and services 
 Foreign Direct Investments 
 Equal distribution of income and wealth 
 Production structure 
Political indicators including: 
 Free elections 
 Free expression 
 Political willingness 
 Definition of national interests 
 Functioning of the party system 
 Participation in elections 
 National pride and sovereignty 
 National security 
 Level of political maturity 
 Functioning of institutions 
Social indicators including: 
 Social participation 
 Respect for human rights 
 Women participation  
These indicators demonstrate that the pattern of regional integration is not defined by 
mere economic criteria; social and political elements play their own role and in many 
cases overweigh the neoclassical economic prerequisites. Abolition of barriers in trade, 
fiscal and other economic transactions is only one part of the whole picture. 
Perceptions of national interest, ethnic identities and cultural norms, national security 
notions as well as dependency paths, play a crucial role in the success or failure of the 
integration process. Thus, political willingness still remains the question.  
This methodological approach is figured as follows:  
Figure 1. Capturing the variables of Regional Economic Integration 
 
Political Variables:  
- Regional Institutions  
(Weak/Strong) 
Economic Variables:  
- Trade Barriers  
- Fiscal-non fiscal 
barriers  
Political Economy Variables:  
- Coincidence of Political 
Interests–Political Barriers 
- Perceptions, Norms, Culture 
- Complementarities of basis of 
Production 
- Complete Institutions to 
enhance integration 
- Inter-State trade and Finance 
Exchanges 
- Technology 
- Infrastructure 
 
Figure 1 makes clear that the variables to be assessed for the evaluation of the pattern 
of regional integration should be considered as follows:  
a. ‘Traditional’ Economic variables: 
1. Trade barriers: the level of removal of trade barriers and trade distortion measures 
and policies is a clear indication of the level of regional economic integration 
achieved. The more the trade barriers are, the less is the progress of integration. 
2. Fiscal and non-fiscal barriers: the elimination of fiscal and non-fiscal barriers and 
distortion measures and policies is a clear indication of regional economic 
integration achieved. The more fiscal and non-fiscal barriers exist, the less is the 
level of integration. 
b. Political variables: 
1. Regional Political Institutions: strong regional institutions mobilizing economic and 
political forces for regional cooperation, is a serious tool of regional integration. 
Whether such initiatives have a solid basis or they are ‘swallow’ is an indication of 
the depth of the undertaken efforts. 
c. Political Economy variables 
1. Coincidence of national interests and political barriers: at a given moment, it 
provides strong impetus and deepens economic integration schemes. The existence 
of political barriers is an important parameter of the advancement of regional 
integration, as historical events, political rivalries and minorities issues are all 
elements that define its prospects.  
2. Perceptions, norms, values, culture: shared perceptions and common values 
between people and governments of different nations are prerequisites for their 
economic cooperation. A broad level of common understanding provides better 
chances for the regional integration process.  
3. Complementarity of the production basis: It is proven that countries with 
complementary production basis have more possibilities to benefit from a regional 
economic integration arrangement. As previously argued, a ‘south-south’ integration 
scheme is expected to be less successful than a ‘north-south’ one. The comparative 
advantage theory applies to economies of complementary production bases - not 
competitive ones.  
4. Complete and mature Institutions: Incomplete and/or immature political and 
economic institutions are a serious impediment for regional integration. This 
variable encompasses administrative capacity, effectiveness, as well as degree of 
corruption and citizens’ satisfaction.  
5. Inter-state trade and financial transactions: form a positive basis for regional 
integration, while their evolvement provides indication for the future prospects of 
the process.  
6. Technology: Regional economic cooperation prospects among countries of low 
technological level are limited. Limited transfer and use of technology allows only 
for poor communication and thus, limited traded and untraded interaction among 
participants. Thus, the necessary formation of shared understanding and cooperation 
is obstructed.    
7. Infrastructure: The existence of extensive transportation networks, 
telecommunications, etc., has a positive contribution to the regional integration 
process. The lack of such an infrastructure is a serious obstacle. 
We apply the above described methodological framework of analysis in order to assess 
the role of political economy in regional economic cooperation in the Western 
Balkans.  
 4. The Political Economy of Regional Integration in the Western Balkans 
The region of Western Balkans consists of the countries of Albania, Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Kosovo (under the UN Resolution 1244), Serbia, 
Montenegro and Bosnia & Herzegovina. The prospects for regional integration will be 
here estimated with the use of the variables of: coincidence of national interest; 
political barriers; common perceptions of norms, principles and culture; 
complementarity of production basis; accomplished and mature institutions; inter-state 
trade and finance transactions; technology; infrastructures.  
a. Coincidence of national interests and political barriers 
It is more than evident that national interests, as they have been pronounced by the 
political elites of the countries concerned, are not coinciding. This is clearly proved by 
a series of indicators, as presented in Table 1. 
Table 1: Coincidence of national interests – Political barriers in the Western Balkans 
NEGATIVE INDICATOR COUNTRIES IMPLICATED 
Cross–boundary disagreements; political 
barriers 
FYROM - Kosovo; Kosovo – Serbia; Serbia 
- B&H 
Conflicting declarations and public 
statements 
Kosovo – Serbia; Serbia – FYROM; Serbia 
– Croatia; Albania - FYROM 
Ethnic minorities rights issues raised All countries in the region 
Separatist aspirations within states Kosovo, FYROM, B&H, Serbia 
Perceptions on potential armed conflict All countries in the region 
It is also characteristic that although most Balkan citizens did not anticipate another 
armed conflict in the region, the proportions of respondents holding this view vary 
between 62% in Serbia and 88% in Croatia (Balkan Monitor, 2010). A notable change 
was registered in Bosnia & Herzegovina since 2009, as the share of respondents 
thinking that the risk of war was not imminent increased sharply by 22 percentage 
points to 49%. Respondents in FYROM and Serbia were the most likely to say that it 
was probable or certain that war would break out in the region (28% and 24%, 
respectively). 
b. Common Perceptions of Norms, Principles and Culture 
Researchers have indicated that the level of common perception in terms of norms, 
principles and cultures among the people in the Western Balkans is still very limited 
(Andrianos, 2007). Related indicators demonstrate that there is still a long distance 
from reaching a common understanding for the region’s shared future under common 
rules and guidelines. Such indices concern: 
 The role of religion. Religion is gaining importance for most ethnic groups in the 
Western Balkans; with the exception of the nationals in FYROM and Bosnians in 
Bosnia & Herzegovina (Balkan Monitor, 2010).  
 The expectation for the future. As in earlier survey, respondents across the Western 
Balkan region were more prone to see better opportunities abroad than at home 
(Balkan Monitor, 2010). Notable developments were registered in Albania and 
Kosovo, where the number of people seeing better opportunities outside their 
country has dramatically reduced since 2008: by 25 percentage points in Kosovo (to 
48%) and by 12 in Albania (to 52%). The opposite was recorded in Croatia and 
Montenegro, where the shares of interviewees seeing better chances abroad have 
increased since 2008, by 17 points (to 48%) and by 14 points (to 52%), respectively. 
 Social and Economic Integration of Minorities. Statistics demonstrate that national 
minorities are not socially and economically integrated. It is characteristic that 
unemployment rates for national minorities still remain considerably higher than for 
the rest of the population in the respective countries. Additionally, people’s free 
mobility is not yet guaranteed, for example in Kosovo; this seriously affects 
minority groups and enclaves in the region (European Commission, 2009b).  The 
situation in Serbia is also ambiguous. More precisely it is stated that (European 
Commission, 2009b): 
 “ As regards Vojvodina no agreement has been reached at national level on the 
adoption of a new Statute. An agreement on the restructuring of the Government 
Coordination Body for southern Serbia was reached. However the situation in 
southern Serbia deteriorated in July 2009 following a number of attacks on the 
Serbian gendarmerie. The situation in Sandžak is volatile; divisions within the 
Muslim community have continued and there have been several outbreaks of 
violence. The number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Serbia 
remains high. The situation for IDPs continues to be very difficult and they are 
faced with many obstacles in exercising their social rights”. 
The situation in Montenegro is also similar (European Commission, 2009c). It is 
stated that: 
“The social and economic situation of displaced persons and the RAE population 
remains a matter of serious concern. They continue to face very difficult living 
conditions and discrimination. Implementation of legislation and strategies must be 
pursued with more determination”. 
c.  Complementarity of the Production basis 
The degree of complementarity of the production basis among the region’s states is 
low. Thus, the possibility for competition among them is more likely than the 
possibility for cooperation. The key structural elements in the economies of the 
Western Balkans include (OECD, 2010): 
 The small size of the private sector; 
 The low level of business innovation and their orientation towards process 
innovation rather than R&D; 
 The weak linkages between business and higher education, along with the related 
skills gap; 
 The domination of low-skill services and natural resource-intensive products in 
exports  
Grupe and Kusic (2005) argue that despite the remaining non-tariff trade 
barriers in South Eastern Europe, the main reason for the low intra-regional trade is 
related to the states’ similarities in production structures and their little 
complementarities. In other words, their comparative advantages are overlapping to a 
large extent. Trade structure - indicated in the dominance of raw-materials- and labour-
intensive products (Kušić and Grupe, 2004) - reflects specialization patterns typical for 
developing countries in their exchanges with developed ones, as capital intensive 
products account for more than one-third of imports (von Hagen and Traistaru, 2003). 
The need for the upgrading of production structures and product differentiation 
through the development of high-quality value-added services and innovation is urgent 
(OECD, 2008, p.19):  
“To support growth, sector specific policy barriers need to be removed. In the apparel 
manufacturing sector, investing in technology to upgrade offering capabilities is key to 
responding to investor requirements: for example, investing in electronic data 
interchange (EDI) to reduce lead times, or in equipment to move from cut-make-trim 
(CMT) manufacturing and become original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) able to 
provide finished goods. However, access to and the cost of finance are a significant 
constraint on investment. On average, companies in the sector need collateral of 
177%, with an interest rate of 11%. There is a need to improve awareness of the type 
of financing available and the requirements for obtaining it. In the automotive 
components sector, there is a need to enhance collaboration efforts with international 
companies to upgrade capabilities. More than 50% of companies are experiencing a 
skills gap in regard to design, supply chain and logistics capabilities. There is a need 
to improve both sector linkages between original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) 
and suppliers, but also to improve awareness of local capabilities that could be 
exploited much further through, for example, regional supplier databases”. 
d. Institutional accomplishment and maturity 
The ‘institutional’ dimension of economies is particularly stressed in contemporary 
approaches. It is argued that institutional development is significant for cross-country 
differences in GDP per capita. Moreover, institutions in neighboring countries turn out 
to be significant as well. Poor institutional structures in neighboring countries increase 
the chance of armed conflict, political turmoil and refugee flows. Good institutions 
may be ineffective when a country is surrounded by institutionally poor neighbors. 
This has a bigger significance nowadays, that not only domestic, but also international 
governance (IMF, the World Bank) for economic success depends more than before on 
improved institutions at the national, as well as the regional level (Simmons and 
Elkins, 2004).  
 Institutional Capacity still has to be developed in the region. Based on EC’s 
appraisal (European Commission, 2009a) we note: 
“Kosovo is not yet ready to negotiate and implement a trade agreement. For 
example, the administrative capacity to ensure the effective implementation of 
antitrust policy and state aid regulation needs to be prepared. As regards 
intellectual property rights, key elements of industrial property rights legislation are 
in place, but Kosovo still needs to build the basic administrative capacity to ensure 
compliance. Kosovo also needs to make significant progress in legislative alignment 
in the area of copyright legislation and enforcement. It also needs to make 
significant progress in the legislative and institutional structures affecting trade in 
goods, including sanitary and phyto-sanitary matters. The institutional framework to 
ensure adequate accreditation, certification, standardization and market 
surveillance needs to be applied effectively”. 
 Level of satisfaction from government’s performance is still limited (Balkan 
Monitor, 2010). Relative majorities of respondents in Albania, Kosovo and 
Montenegro were satisfied with their countries’ government. In Serbia, Croatia and 
Bosnia & Herzegovina, respondents were at least three times more disapproving 
their countries’ government. Albania was an exception, as citizens’ approval of the 
government has increased strongly by 17 percentage points (to 48%) since 2006. 
 Perceptions on the level of corruption. Concern on corruption is considerably high 
in the countries of the region (Euractiv, 2010). A survey (carried out in September 
2009) revealed that more than two-thirds of Balkan respondents see corruption as 
"pervasive" and "widespread" in both government and business. The perception of 
corruption in the business sector is highest in Croatia (92%), Serbia (91%) and 
Bosnia & Herzegovina (90%), while rising in all countries since 2006, with the 
exception of Albania and FYROM. The perception of corruption in government is 
highest in Kosovo (84%) and Bosnia & Herzegovina (81%), with Montenegro being 
a notable exception (49%). Alarmingly, more than a quarter of the respondents in 
Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo said they are personally affected by organised 
crime in their day-to-day life. More than half of the respondents in Albania said they 
had to offer a bribe or gift in order to work out their affairs last year, in contrast to 
just 8% of the respondents in Croatia. 
e. Inter-state trade and financial transactions 
Inter-state trade and financial transactions are limited within the region, although 
economic integration of the individual states with the EU has significantly progressed. 
This brings forth the issue of preferential ‘north-south’ integration, at the expense of 
‘south-south’ integration. In their work, Jackson and Petrakos (2001) estimate the 
effects of structural changes in the external trade of the Balkan transition countries on 
the recovery rate of their economies. They point out the rigidities in the development 
efforts in the region, which are reflected in inter-industry trade, labor- and material-
intensive export sectors, withdrawal of cross-border trade, and excessive trade 
dependence on the EU. The outcome is lower increase in exports, larger deficits, lower 
productivity and weaker economic systems, compared to the Central European 
transition countries.  
The statement of the European Commission for Kosovo (European 
Commission, 2009) is characteristic:  
“The openness of the economy, measured by the value of imports plus exports in goods 
and services as a percentage of GDP, increased to 71.1% in 2008, up from 64.5% in 
2007. EU Member States and CEFTA continued to be the two main trading partners 
for Kosovo, accounting for 40% of total trade each, the latter despite Serbia’s 
blocking the exports and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s refusing preferential treatment. 
The share of exports bound for the EU increased from 42% in 2007 to 47.8% in 2008. 
The EU’s share of total imports remained at around 36%. Overall, economic 
integration with the EU has increased”. 
All Western Balkan countries have significant deficits of goods trade and of 
combined goods and services trade, emphasizing the importance of improving their 
export performance. The impact of bilateral Foreign Trade Agreements that came into 
effect in the region has not yet been studied so that to allow for a safe judgment. The 
reported data reflect vast increases in imports and exports, although one cannot 
identify from these data alone a positive effect of the FTAs – i.e. whether their effects 
have been beneficial, or whether the adverse impact of their design will dominate, as 
suggested by Kaminski and De la Rocha (2003). (Bartlett, 2009) 
We stress here that open borders and increased trade relations within the 
broader region - and especially among neighboring countries – is a prerequisite for 
efficient entrepreneurship. Neighboring countries provide a favorable market, because 
of: (i) similar consumer preferences (formed by shared history and culture), that 
require less effort and cost for products promotion; and (ii) territorial proximity, that 
reduces transport costs. Trade promotion in the broader region and, especially cross-
border trade among neighboring countries, should be therefore a strategic priority for 
the Western Balkans. According to Petrakos (2002), the more peripheral the location 
of a developing or transitional economy, the more important is cross-border trade for 
maintaining variety and sectoral differentiation in the production system.   
Achieving regional integration, beyond merchandise trade liberalization, 
requires government actions that reduce the market-segmentation caused by domestic 
regulatory policies. The benefits of a deeper integration lie in the creation of a single 
economic space and include greater contestability, a larger market, greater economies 
of scale – all evidenced in intra-regional supply chains, higher FDI, increased 
efficiency of the ‘backbone’ sectors and increased intra-regional trade (Kathuria, 
2008). 
f. Technology 
The level of technology in the countries of the region is considerably low. For Kosovo, 
for example it is stated that (European Commission, 2009): 
“Overall, the technology base and the state of physical infrastructure remain weak 
and the pool of qualified human capital small. As a result, Kosovo companies are too 
rarely competitive even in sectors where competitive potential exists”.  
The situation for the rest of the countries of the region is very much the same. 
It is also characteristic that high technology exports as a percentage of manufactured 
exports of Albania and Bosnia & Herzegovina accounted in 2008 for 4% (World Bank, 
2011). Accordingly, is stated by OECD (2008, p.20) that:  
“Due to the mismatch between skills demanded and skills supply, the Western Balkans 
faces a serious challenge in supporting growth in most sectors. For example, 44% of 
automotive component companies identify availability of skills as a top challenge they 
face in expanding operations. Lack of skills has a negative impact on competitiveness 
– increasing operating costs, lowering output quality and contributing to a loss of 
business. Mechanisms for institutionalization and dialogue between ministries of 
economy/industry and education are limited. This reduces the possibilities to match 
supply with demand at the structural level. Moreover, many nationally sponsored 
reform initiatives fail to include all relevant stakeholders in the reform process, 
limiting the political support needed to see reforms through”. 
g. Infrastructure 
In overall, infrastructures in Western Balkans – e.g. road transport, railways as well as 
aviation - are considered to be poor and under-developed (European Commission, 
2009). Infrastructure is considered to be among the weaker elements when considering 
the prospects of regional integration in Western Balkans. For example, according to 
INSTAT (2006) trade expansion between Albania and the other Balkan states is 
limited as there has been little history of trade relations to build upon; and moreover, 
transport links are poor and the mountainous geography that surrounds the country is 
forbidding. Poor transport infrastructure and the multiplicity of borders represent a 
significant barrier to trade for all exporters in the region (Bartlet, 2009). According to 
Petrakos (2000), given the weak regional trade flows, the serious infrastructure gaps, 
and the diversity of the Balkan countries, prospects for economic integration in the 
region are modest. 
Our empirical analysis is summarized in Table 2.  
Table 2: Political Economy Variables for Regional Integration in the Western Balkans 
Level of Accomplishment/Intensity 
VARIABLE LEVEL OF ACCOMPLISHMENT - INTENSITY 
 Low High 
Coincidence of national interest 
and political barriers 
√ for coincidence of 
national interest 
√ for political barriers 
Common Perceptions on Norms, 
Principles, Culture 
√  
Complementarity of Productive 
Basis 
√  
Complete and Mature Institutions √  
Inter State Trade and Finance 
Transactions 
√  
Technology √  
Infrastructure √  
The above table clearly demonstrates that the variables denoting regional 
integration prospects among the Western Balkans economies show a remarkably 
negative tendency. This justifies the limited success of the so far undertaken attempts 
as well as their dim future prospects. 
 
5. Conclusions and Assumptions for the future 
So far, the main instrument of regional integration in the Western Balkans has been a 
network of bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) which the Balkan countries have 
adopted under the guidance of the Stability Pact for South East Europe (SEE), and 
more recently the extension of the CEFTA free trade area to the region. The bilateral 
FTAs have been criticized for creating differentiated trade relations and at the same 
time, other arrangements – such as the contractual relations of individual countries 
with the EU – further fragment mutual trade relations in the region (Bartlett 2009). The 
poverty-stricken and politically unstable countries of the Western Balkans are 
characterized by over-reliance on traditional industry and agriculture, both lacking 
international competitiveness; overdependence on FDI, uneven distribution and power 
asymmetries between small firms and international investors.  
As the region recently demonstrates an economic slowdown, the need for 
alternative strategies of economic and regional development has come forth. In this 
paper we argue that normative neoclassical approaches provide an inadequate 
framework for the assessment of the potential of undertaken efforts, as well as the 
prediction of the future of regional integration attempts. We suggest a set of variables 
that capture the political economy dimension of such attempts and processes, and 
allow for an in depth analysis and evaluation of both current and future endeavors. We 
introduce a comprehensible framework for such a task which entails variables such as: 
the coincidence in political interests and political barriers; common perceptions, 
values, principles and culture; institutional accomplishment and maturity; 
complementarily of production basis; trade flows and financial transactions; 
technology; and infrastructure. 
The proposed framework provides adequate explanation of the pattern of 
regional integration in Western Balkans, and allows for an evaluation of the 
undertaken efforts and future perspectives. The outcome of the analysis demonstrates 
why the efforts of the individual states towards regional integration have poor results; 
it depicts the important reasons that counteract the undertaken attempts or impede any 
planned ones. In the heart of the issue lies the fact that was empirically substantiated: 
the weak intensity and low level of accomplishment of the proposed measured political 
economy variables. A useful contribution of our analysis for the identification of 
obstacles at the different levels of the regional integration process, would be the 
establishment of constructive recommendations that will improve the effectiveness of 
existing coordination and will forge the necessary linkages between the various 
stakeholders (central governments, border communities, public and private 
enterprises). 
In the case of the Western Balkans, we conclude that regional integration may 
be achieved only through a top-down approach, namely a European 
Union/International Community enforced process, rather than through bottom-up 
initiatives of the individual states in the region. This framework of analysis could also 
be useful for the assessment of regional integration arrangements and processes among 
less developed or developing economies, especially in war-torn countries, with 
multiethnic societies and related particularities . Such cases can be identified in the 
regions of Central and Sub Saharan Africa, or Central Asia. The level of intensity and 
accomplishment of the proposed political economy variables provide an indicator of 
the potential for regional integration. 
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